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I.	Introduction

In 2005, a federal grand jury indicted Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, former
employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), for allegedly
conspiring with a government official to obtain and transmit national defense
information in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917.1 The Department of Justice
alleged that Rosen and Weissman had conspired with a third defendant, Lawrence
Franklin, to obtain national defense information Franklin had acquired as a Pentagon
analyst, and to communicate that information to journalists and foreign officials. 2
The conduct on which the AIPAC prosecution was based—the receipt and
transmission of classified information in violation of the Espionage Act—led to
renewed concerns among journalists about the reach of this statute and similar laws
to their own newsgathering conduct. Although the United States ultimately
abandoned the AIPAC prosecution, claiming several rulings in the case had made it
difficult for the government to meet its burden, the concerns for journalists raised by
the prosecution remain.3 In the AIPAC prosecution, the government sought to hold
private citizens criminally liable for the kind of conduct journalists engage in every
day—receiving and transmitting information from persons who themselves may have
violated the law in providing it.
This article examines the limitations, if any, placed by the First Amendment on
the permissible reach of criminal statutes as applied to journalists, either directly or
through principles of secondary liability, in the wake of the publication of information
allegedly received from a person who may have accessed or provided such information
in violation of a criminal statute. Part II provides an overview of the general First
Amendment principles that must inform any analysis of the reach of criminal statutes
to the media’s newsgathering conduct. Part III examines the interplay between the
First Amendment and various theories of criminal liability as applied to the press’s
unauthorized receipt and publication of information ordinarily protected against
public disclosure. Part IV summarizes the authors’ conclusions about the constraints
imposed by the First Amendment on the prosecution of journalists for engaging in
such conduct.

1.

See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Va. 2009). Rosen and Weissman were
indicted under two subsections of the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (g), which criminalize the
communication of national defense information to persons not authorized to receive it. Rosen, 599 F.
Supp. 2d at 693.

2.

Franklin pled guilty to several charges as part of a plea bargain and received a twelve-year prison
sentence, which was later reduced to ten months’ house arrest. Rosen, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 693; Jerry
Markon, Sentence Reduced in Pentagon Case, Wash. Post, June 12, 2009, at A12.

3.

Indeed, a Federal Bureau of Investigation linguist recently pled guilty to providing classified information
to a blogger and was sentenced to twenty months in prison, suggesting that unauthorized disclosures of
information to the press will continue to raise questions about the press’s alleged role in criminal
conduct. See Josh Gerstein, Justice Dept. Cracks Down on Leaks, Politico (May 25, 2010, 4:44 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37721.html.
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II.	Governing First Amendment Principles

A. Truthful Speech About Newsworthy Matters

Contemporary interpretation of the First Amendment proceeds from the premise
that “[t]he freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of
public concern without . . . fear of subsequent punishment.”4 Thus, in a variety of
contexts, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “truthful information about a
matter of public significance” receives extremely broad constitutional protection from
the reach of criminal and civil statutes.5 The Court has in fact explained that, even
when “a matter of public significance” is not involved, “state action to punish the
publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”6 In
short, there is an “overarching ‘public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the
dissemination of truth.’” 7
In the context of publications addressing newsworthy matters of public concern,
moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the protection of truthful speech is at its
zenith.8 Under such circumstances, “[t]ruth may not be the subject of either civil or
criminal sanctions.” 9 Indeed, the “general proposition that freedom of expression
upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment”10 is so firmly entrenched
in the First Amendment that it forms the foundation for the Supreme Court’s
elaborate jurisprudence holding that even false and defamatory speech about
newsworthy matters must be afforded broad protection from criminal and civil
liability in order to provide sufficient “breathing space” for the dissemination of
truthful information about such matters.11 As the Court explained most recently in
Bartnicki v. Vopper,12 “[t]hose cases all relied on our ‘profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen,’” and “require[] the conclusion” that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not
4.

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101– 02 (1940).

5.

Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533–34 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97,
103 (1979)).

6.

Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 102 – 03; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (holding that, even in commercial speech context, “the First Amendment
presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all”).

7.

Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)).

8.

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (stating that accurate information about newsworthy
matters “occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,’ and is entitled to
special protection” (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982))).

9.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964); see also Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
778 (1986) (“[S]peech of public concern is at the core of the First Amendment’s protections.” (citing
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985))).

10.

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).

11.

Id. at 279 n.19; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).

12.

532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the
highest order.”13
B. Newsworthy Matters of “Public Concern”

As the Supreme Court observed in Time, Inc. v. Hill, “[t]he guarantees for speech
and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs,
essential as those are to healthy government.”14 Rather, the Court has explained that
“[f]reedom of discussion, if it [is to] fulfill its historic function in this nation, must
embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”15 Thus, in a variety
of contexts, courts have determined that “a publication is newsworthy if some
reasonable members of the community could entertain a legitimate interest in it.”16
These holdings are synthesized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the public is not limited to
“news,” in the sense of reports of current events or activities. It extends also to
the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for
purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may
reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.17

And matters cease to be newsworthy only “when the community has no interest in
them beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a
stranger,”18 or when the interest in the matter constitutes “a morbid and sensational
prying into private lives for its own sake.”19
In this manner, both the First Amendment and the common law distinguish the
unprotected publication of putatively private information “for its own sake,” on the
one hand, from the protected publication of the same information when it relates to
matters of broader public concern, on the other.20 Thus, for example, in Florida Star v.
13.

Id. at 528, 534 –35 (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270; Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

14.

385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).

15.

Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 485 (Cal. 1998) (noting that judicial analysis of
whether a publication addresses a newsworthy subject “incorporates considerable deference to reporters
and editors, avoiding the likelihood of unconstitutional interference with the freedom of the press to
report truthfully on matters of legitimate public interest”).

16.

Shulman, 955 P.2d at 485.

17.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. j (1977).

18.

Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).

19.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. h (1977) (emphasis added).

20. See, e.g., Hill, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7 (1967) (“[I]t has been agreed that there is a generous privilege to serve

the public interest in news” in the face of claims “against the press for public disclosure of truthful but
private details about the individual which caused emotional upset to him.” (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr.,
Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & Contemp. Probs. 326, 355–56 (1966))
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981)
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B.J.F., where a newspaper acquired and published the name of a rape victim in
violation of state law, the Supreme Court held that, though unquestionably private,
the plaintiff ’s identity constituted “information about a matter of public significance,”
especially “[a]t a time in which we are daily reminded of the tragic reality of rape.”21
Similarly, in Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., the California Supreme Court
concluded that a television broadcast depicting an accident victim’s “appearance and
words during [a] rescue and evacuation” were “of legitimate public interest,” both
because “[a]utomobile accidents are by their nature of interest to that great portion of
the public that travels frequently by automobile” and because the “rescue and medical
treatment of accident victims is also of legitimate concern to much of the public,
involving as it does a critical service that any member of the public may someday
need.”22
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the protection afforded
by the First Amendment to newsworthy matters of public concern may not vary
based on the identity of the publisher of such information, the perceived “value” of
the information reported, or whether the publisher profited from its dissemination.
First, as the Court famously explained in Lovell v. City of Griffin:
The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets . . . . The press in its historic
connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion. 23

Thus, for example, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court extended First
Amendment protection to an advertising parody published in Hustler magazine,
which depicted the Reverend Jerry Falwell engaged in an “incestuous rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse.”24 The Court so held despite its recognition that the
parody “published in Hustler [was] at best a distant cousin” of the editorial cartoons
that for centuries have played a significant role in public discourse, reasoning that “a
central tenet of the First Amendment [is] that the government must remain neutral
in the marketplace of ideas.”25
(holding that the newsworthiness concept “properly restricts liability for public disclosure of private
facts to the extreme case, thereby providing the breathing space needed by the press to properly exercise
effective editorial judgment”).
21.

491 U.S. 524, 536 –37 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).

22.

955 P.2d 469, 487–88 (Cal. 1998).

23.

303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); see also Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)
(“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works fall within
the First Amendment guarantee.”); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (“[T]he press . . .
includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars.”).

24.

485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).

25.

Id. at 55–56 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978)) (internal quotation mark
omitted); see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“Though we can see nothing of any
possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as
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Second, the Supreme Court has expressly disavowed any test of whether particular
“speech” falls within the protections of the First Amendment that is premised on ad
hoc determinations of its “value” in comparison with the “harm” it is alleged to have
perpetrated. 26 Instead, the Court has constructed a handful of narrow, precisely
defined categories of expression that are not protected by the First Amendment at
all, including obscenity, defamation, and “fighting words,” 27 and has rejected the
notion that constitutional analysis of otherwise protected expression should depend on
judicial assessment of its comparative worth. 28 As the Ninth Circuit has explained:
[T]he first amendment is as close to an absolute as we have in our jurisprudence:
Speech shielded by the amendment’s protective wing must remain inviolate
regardless of its inherent worth. The distaste we may feel as individuals
toward the content or message of protected expression cannot, of course,
detain us from discharging our duty as guardians of the Constitution. 29

Finally, the Court has consistently held that whether a publication is sold for
profit is of no relevance for First Amendment purposes.30 Accordingly, the Ninth
the best of literature.”); Shulman, 955 P.2d at 482 (“[T]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of
expression apply with equal force to [a] publication whether it be a news report or an entertainment
feature . . . .” (omission in original) (quoting Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 443 (Cal. 1953))
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of

free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social
costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”); id. at 1586 (rejecting notion that a
test may be applied “to permit the Government to imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed
valueless or unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute’s favor”).

27.

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has in
recent years “narrowed the scope” of even these “traditional categorical exceptions”); Stevens, 130 S. Ct.
at 1583–84 (declining to hold that depictions of animal cruelty, as a class, constitute unprotected
speech).

28. See, e.g., Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55–56 (“The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient

reason for suppressing it.” (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 745) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Am.
Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331–32 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that the Supreme
Court “sometimes balances the value of speech against the cost of its restriction, but it does this by
category of speech and not by the content of particular works”), aff ’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); United
States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has
“refused to embrace the notion that the degree of first amendment protection ‘depend[s] on the Court’s
judgment as to the value of the protected speech that might be deterred’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761– 62 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))).

29. U.S. Dist. Court, 858 F.2d at 541; see also Dible v. Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he

degree of protection the first amendment affords speech does not vary with the social value ascribed to
that speech by the courts.” (quoting Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

30. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989) (“If a profit motive

could somehow strip communications of the otherwise available constitutional protection, our cases
from New York Times to Hustler Magazine would be little more than empty vessels.”); City of Lakewood
v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 756 n.5 (1988) (“[T]he degree of First Amendment protection
is not diminished merely because the newspaper or speech is sold rather than given away.”); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (“Speech . . . is
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Circuit has explained that “[a] profit motive . . . does not diminish a journalist’s First
Amendment rights” and “does not render its newsgathering and reporting
activities . . . [as] entitled to less than full First Amendment protection.”31
C. Governmental Interest of the “Highest Order”

As the Supreme Court noted in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the protections afforded by
the First Amendment to accurate speech about newsworthy matters may properly
give way only in the face of a statutory scheme that is narrowly tailored to vindicate
a governmental interest of the “highest order.”32 In this regard, the Court has
explained that the First Amendment’s protections may properly be divested “only in
exceptional cases”33 because imposition of “a penal sanction for publishing lawfully
obtained, truthful information . . . requires the highest form of state interest to
sustain its validity.”34 To date, the Court has defined such “exceptional cases” narrowly
to include the following circumstances: “[W]hen the country is at war, when a
sovereign seeks to protect the primary requirements of decency by prohibiting
obscenity, and when the security of community life is threatened by incitements to
acts of violence and the overthrow by force of an orderly government.”35
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed a perceived “collision
between claims of privacy and those of the free press,”36 and, in each such instance, it
has applied the First Amendment to protect truthful speech about newsworthy
matters. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, for example, the father of a rape-murder
victim brought an invasion of privacy action against a broadcasting company for
disclosing in a news report his daughter’s identity in violation of a Georgia statute.37
The Court held that the First Amendment prohibited such a claim in the face of the
“public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth,”38 because
the broadcast involved a newsworthy matter of public concern, as opposed to
revelation of “purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs.”39 In so holding,
protected [by the First Amendment] even though it is carried in a form that is ‘sold’ for profit . . . .”);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books, newspapers, and magazines are
published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is
safeguarded by the First Amendment.”).
31.

Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251, 1259– 60 (9th Cir. 1985).

32.

532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).

33.

Worrell Newspapers of Ind., Inc. v. Westhafer¸ 739 F.2d 1219, 1223 (7th Cir. 1984), aff ’d, 469 U.S.
1200 (1985).

34. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 101– 02.
35.

Worrell Newspapers, 739 F.2d at 1223.

36. E.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
37.

Id. at 492.

38. Id. at 491 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
39.

Id. (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72 n.8).
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the Court noted “a strong tide running in favor of the so-called right of privacy,”40
but concluded that, despite these “impressive credentials,”41 the government interest
in preserving personal privacy must yield to the “First and Fourteenth Amendments
and . . . the public interest in a vigorous press.”42
Similarly, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court confronted the criminal
prosecution of a newspaper, which, following a shooting at a junior high school,
obtained and published the name of the alleged juvenile assailant in violation of a
West Virginia statute.43 At the outset of its analysis, the Court noted that “[o]ur recent
decisions demonstrate that state action to punish the publication of truthful information
seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”44 Accordingly, the Court held that the
state’s interest in protecting the privacy of youthful offenders—an interest that was
not only of immediate reputational nature but that also related to the ability of the
child to rejoin society after the imposition of any sanction by the juvenile court—was
not of sufficient magnitude when confronted by the First Amendment.45
In Florida Star, the statute at issue made it “unlawful to ‘print, publish, or
broadcast . . . in any instrument of mass communication’ the name of the victim of a
sexual offense.”46 In holding that it could not be applied to a newspaper reporter who
learned the name of a rape victim and thereafter published it in the newspaper’s
“Police Reports” section, the Court explained that, although the governmental
interests said to be served by the statute —i.e., the protection of the privacy of victims,
the protection of the physical safety of victims, and the encouragement of victims to
report such crimes—were “highly significant,” they were nevertheless insufficient to
trump the First Amendment.47
Most recently, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held that two radio stations and a
radio talk show host could not be held liable under the federal and Pennsylvania
wiretap statutes for receiving from a third party, and thereafter disclosing to their
listeners, a tape recording of a private telephone conversation between the two
plaintiffs that had been surreptitiously recorded in violation of those statutes.48 The
Court noted that the case “present[s] a conflict between interests of the highest
order—on the one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information
concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy”
fortified by the right of the plaintiffs, grounded in the First Amendment as well, to
40. Id. at 488.
41.

Id. at 489.

42.

Id. at 495.

43.

433 U.S. 97, 98–101 (1979).

44. Id. at 102.
45.

Id. at 104.

46. 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) (omission in original) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 794.03 (1987)).
47.

See id. at 537, 541.

48. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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engage in “private speech.”49 Nevertheless, even though the “stated purpose[]” of the
wiretap statutes was “to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral
communications,”50 and even though “[p]rivacy of communication[s] is an important
interest,”51 especially given the fact that “the fear of public disclosure of private
conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech,”52 the Court held
that the statutes could not be applied in these circumstances because “[they] impose[]
sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern.”53 Specifically,
the Court held as follows:
In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
publishing matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in
their classic law review article: “The right of privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest.” One of the costs
associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy.54

49. Id. at 518. Because the wiretap statutes served to vindicate the First Amendment-based right to engage

in “private speech,” the Court distinguished its decisions in Cox Broadcasting, Daily Mail, and Florida
Star on the ground that, while those cases involved assertions of an important—but non-constitutional—
interest in protecting personal privacy, in Bartnicki there were “important interests to be considered on
both sides of the constitutional calculus.” Id. at 533. As Justice Breyer explained in his concurring opinion
in Bartnicki, in cases in which there are constitutional rights “on both sides of the equation, the key
question becomes one of proper fit,” id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted),
and the Court must determine “whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speechrestricting and speech-enhancing consequences,” id. In the typical case, however, in which the privacy
interest is not grounded in the First Amendment itself, there is a dispositive lack of equivalence between
the First Amendment right to disseminate truthful speech, on the one hand, and the governmental
interest in protecting personal privacy, on the other—i.e., only the former is protected by the written
Constitution.

50. Id. at 523 (quoting Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801(b),

82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

51.

Id. at 532.

52.

Id. at 533.

53.

Id. at 534.

54. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.

L. Rev. 193, 214 (1890)); see also id. (“Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant
of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.” (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 388 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The common law privacy tort, the creation of
which was championed by Warren and Brandeis in response to their concern that the late nineteenthcentury “press was overstepping its prerogatives by publishing essentially private information and that
there should be a remedy for [such] abuses,” Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975), has
from the outset been cabined by the recognition that “[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit any
publication of matter which is of public or general interest.” Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 214. This is
despite the fact that, as early as 1890, “[g]ossip . . . ha[d] become a trade, which [was] pursued with
industry as well as effrontery” to “satisfy a prurient taste.” Id. at 196; see also William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 411–12 (1960) (“[T]he press has a privilege, guaranteed by the Constitution, to
inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest,” which “arises out
of the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the
press and other agencies of information to tell them.”); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,
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D. “Unlawfully Acquired” Information

In all of its cases addressing the First Amendment’s protection of truthful
information about newsworthy matters, the Court has recognized that such
protections necessarily apply when the information has been “lawfully obtain[ed]” by
its publisher.55 In Bartnicki, the Court specifically considered whether, “[w]here the
punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a
manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the
government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect
in a chain?”56 The Court answered the question in the negative, holding that “a
stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield
from speech about a matter of public concern.”57 This is so, the Court explained,
even when the press obtains the information with actual knowledge of the source’s
unlawful conduct.58
This conclusion followed from the Court’s previous decisions, most notably
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia 59 and Florida Star. In Landmark
Communications, unidentified persons—including one described by the resulting
article as “a lawyer subpoenaed to appear at the hearing”60 —provided information in
violation of a criminal statute to a newspaper regarding a confidential proceeding
before Virginia’s Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.61 The Court held that
the statute could not constitutionally be applied to the newspaper.62 Although the
Court was silent on this point, it appears that whoever initially disclosed confidential
information in Landmark did so in violation of a statutory duty imposed on him as a
participant in the Commission’s proceedings. Similarly, in Florida Star, the police
official who provided the rape victim’s name to the newspaper did so in violation of
an analogous duty.63 Nevertheless, in both cases, as in Bartnicki itself, the Court held
478 (Cal. 1998) (holding that “newsworthiness” is a “complete bar to common law liability” under the
“publication of private facts” tort); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977) (stating that to
impose liability for publication of private facts, plaintiff must prove that the published material “is not
of legitimate concern to the public”).
55.

See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979); Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.

56. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added) (quoting Boehner v. McDermott (Boehner I ), 191 F.3d 463,

484–85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated, 532 U.S.
1050 (2001).

57.

Id. at 535.

58. See id. at 517–18 (emphasizing that, although the defendants “did not participate in the interception, . . .

they did know—or at least had reason to know—that the interception was unlawful”).

59.

435 U.S. 829 (1978).

60. Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities & Organizations in Support of Respondents at 11, Bartnicki, 532

U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728).

61.

Landmark Commc’ns, 435 U.S. at 837.

62. See id. at 838.
63. Name, Address, Etc., of Sex-Crime Victim Exempt From Pub. Records Law, Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 075-

203 (July 14, 1975), available at http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/8C3790DB6191D6
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that such unlawful conduct by a newspaper’s source does not vitiate the protection
afforded to the newspaper by the First Amendment.
Following Bartnicki, the lower courts have explored the extent to which a
publisher’s interaction with a source who unlawfully acquires information can be said
to implicate the publisher itself in illegal conduct that might provide a constitutional
basis for civil or criminal liability. In Boehner v. McDermott, for example, which the
Supreme Court remanded to the D.C. Circuit for further consideration in light of
Bartnicki, the court of appeals addressed the liability of a Congressman who met
personally with a married couple that had illegally recorded a wireless telephone
conversation, acquired a recording of the conversation from them, promised them
both anonymity and immunity from prosecution in return, and then disseminated
the recording to two newspaper reporters.64 Although the court was sharply divided
on the issue, a majority rejected the contention that “[o]ne who obtains information
in an illegal transaction, with full knowledge the transaction is illegal, has not
‘lawfully obtain[ed]’ that information.”65 Rather, the court’s majority concluded that
“the otherwise-lawful receipt of unlawfully obtained information remains in itself
lawful, even where the receiver knows or has reason to know that the source has
obtained the information unlawfully.”66 As the majority explained:
The Supreme Court has decided the first issue of this case, that is, whether
the United States . . . can constitutionally bar the publication of information
originally obtained by unlawful interception but otherwise lawfully received
by the communicator, in the negative. We venture to say that an opposite rule
would be fraught with danger. Just as Representative McDermott knew that
the information had been unlawfully intercepted, so did the newspapers to
whom he passed the information. . . . We do not believe the First Amendment
permits this interdiction of public information either at the stage of the
newspaper-reading public, of the newspaper-publishing communicators, or at
the stage of Representative McDermott’s disclosure to the news media.67

93852566B70066A4C5 (“A police chief who is the custodian of any such records containing such
identifying information is obligated and charged with the duty by operation of law not to allow or
permit public inspection or examination of such records.”).
64. (Boehner II ), 484 F.3d 573, 575–76 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
65.

Id. at 585 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original) (quoting Boehner v. McDermott
(Boehner III ), 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted). A majority
of the court joined in Part I of Judge Sentelle’s dissent, which discusses the Bartnicki holding as applied
to the facts in Boehner. Id. at 581 (Griffith, J., concurring).

66. Id. at 585 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
67.

Id. at 586. A different majority of the same court upheld the entry of summary judgment against
Representative McDermott because he, unlike the newspapers that subsequently received the same
information from him, had violated a legal duty imposed on him as a member of the House Ethics
Committee to maintain the confidentiality of information provided to him in that capacity. See id. at
581 (“When Representative McDermott became a member of the Ethics Committee, he voluntarily
accepted a duty of confidentiality that covered his receipt and handling of the . . . illegal recording. He
therefore had no First Amendment right to disclose the tape to the media.”).
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Similarly, in Jean v. Massachusetts State Police, the First Circuit, applying Bartnicki
and citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Boehner, held that the First Amendment
protected the Internet posting of an audio and video recording of an arrest and
warrantless search of a private residence, even though the person who posted it had
reason to know at the time she received the recording that it had been made illegally.68
The court rejected the contention that “the essential distinction between this case
and Bartnicki was that [i]n Bartnicki, the interceptor had already disseminated the
tape before [the defendant] passively received it and disseminated it further,” while in
Jean, “it was Jean’s active collaboration” with the interceptor “that made his unlawful
dissemination possible in the first instance.”69 Relying on Boehner II, the court
reasoned that, “if McDermott had been a private citizen, like Jean, the court would
have concluded that his disclosure of the tape was subject to First Amendment
protection regardless of the fact that he received the tape directly” from the interceptor
with knowledge that it had been obtained unlawfully.70
These decisions reflect the reality that the press routinely seeks out information
from a variety of sources, many of whom may be held to have violated a statute, a
private contract, or some other legal or ethical duty either in obtaining the information
or by disclosing it to the press. The courts have nevertheless concluded that, when
the press induces sources to disclose what they know about newsworthy matters, it is
protected by the First Amendment when it proceeds to publish such information,
regardless of the legality of its source’s actions.71
III. Criminal Liability and the First Amendment

A. Applicable Principles of Statutory Construction

To satisfy due process, a criminal statute must define the prohibited conduct
“with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited” and “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
68. 492 F.3d 24, 30 –33 (1st Cir. 2007).
69. Id. at 31 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id. at 32.
71.

See, e.g., Scheetz v. Morning Call, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1515, 1526 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting a claim that
the press unlawfully received a confidential police report through a conspiracy with unnamed police
sources on the grounds that a reporter who copies information contained in such a report “would not be
a receiver of . . . stolen goods”), aff ’d, 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991); Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers,
223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 64 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the First Amendment precludes tort claims against
the press for “soliciting, inquiring, requesting and persuading agents, employees and members of the
State Bar to engage in the unauthorized and unlawful disclosure of information” because “the news
gathering component of the freedom of the press—the right to seek out information—is privileged at
least to the extent it involves ‘routine . . . reporting techniques’” such as “asking persons questions,
including those with confidential or restricted information” (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v.
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))); Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 406 A.2d 652,
656 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (finding no tort liability where a newspaper secured confidential student
transcripts from a source because “the information, though perhaps emanating ultimately from
confidential University records, was not obtained by any personal act of invasion or intrusion” by the
newspaper).
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enforcement.”72 A criminal statute that fails to satisfy these conditions will be deemed
“void-for-vagueness.”73 But if it can, a court will construe a statute narrowly to avoid
such a result.74
The Court applied these principles of statutory construction most recently in
Skilling v. United States, a decision arising from the criminal prosecution of long-time
Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling.75 In Skilling, the Court considered whether 18
U.S.C. § 1346, known as the “honest services fraud” provision of the federal mail
and wire fraud statutes,76 was impermissibly vague and therefore violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.77 The Court construed the statute to reach
only bribes and kickbacks, thereby limiting its reach to avoid offending the Fifth
Amendment.78
Section 1346 establishes that a “scheme or artifice to defraud” for purposes of the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes “includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another
of the intangible right of honest services.” 79 The legislative history of § 1346 reveals
that the predominant purpose of the statute was to “reverse” the Supreme Court’s
decision in McNally v. United States, in which the Court held that the mail fraud
statute was designed to protect money and property rights, not the alleged right of
the citizenry to “good government.”80 Thus, in enacting § 1346, Congress sought
nothing more than to enable the wire and mail fraud statutes to be used as vehicles
for prosecution of public corruption.81
Given its broad language, however, judicial construction of § 1346 before Skilling
understandably focused on “‘the need to find limiting principles’ to cabin” its scope
because, “[w]ithout some kind of limiting principle, honest services wire fraud could
potentially make relatively innocuous conduct subject to criminal sanctions.”82 Thus,
72. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927–28 (2010); see also Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct.

2963, 2968 (2010) (reiterating the essential holding of Skilling).

73. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928.
74.

See id. (noting prior case law “which requires us, if we can, to construe, not condemn, Congress’
enactments”).

75. See id. at 2907, 2927–28.
76. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2006); Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927.
77.

See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927–28.

78. Id. at 2931.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
80. 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987); see, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. 23,953 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden) (“This bill

will make it possible, once again, to prosecute and send to prison those public officials who corrupt their
offices and betray the trust placed in them.”); 134 Cong. Rec. 33,296–97 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Conyers) (“[A]s a result of the McNally decision many significant prosecutions of political corruption
brought under the mail and wire fraud statutes have been dismissed or overturned on appeal. . . . This
amendment restores the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the McNally decision.”).

81.

See supra note 80.

82. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 795

(2009); see also United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997) (observing that without
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although some courts concluded that the statute may reach the conduct of private,
non-governmental defendants in at least some circumstances,83 others extended such
liability to private persons only where there was a fiduciary relationship between the
victim and the defendant.84 Still others did so only where the defendant intended or
reasonably could have foreseen that the scheme would cause economic or property
harm.85 In any case, under certain circumstances journalists obtaining information
from persons who violated a law (or their employer’s policies) in accessing or disclosing
the information arguably were vulnerable to prosecution under the statute.86 For its
part, the Court noted in Skilling that “there was considerable disarray” among the
courts of appeals concerning the proper scope of the statute’s application.87 Still, the
Court declined to invalidate the statute, choosing instead to construe it, consistent
with its legislative history, to reach only bribery and kickback schemes.88 In doing so,
the Court explained: “It has long been our practice, . . . before striking a federal
statute as impermissibly vague, to consider whether the prescription is amenable to a
limiting construction.”89
This principle of narrow construction should apply with equal force where the
prosecution in question arises from the newsgathering conduct of a journalist or
news organization. As the Court has put it, criminal statutes that potentially inhibit
the exercise of First Amendment rights “must be scrutinized with particular care.”90
Most significantly, such statutes must be construed narrowly to avoid conflicts with
the First Amendment.91 Narrow construction has been deemed to be particularly
appropriate limiting principles, honest services fraud amendment could criminalize “every breach of
contract or every misstatement made in the course of dealing”).
83. See, e.g., United States v. McGeehan, 584 F.3d 560, 569 –70 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing examples of cases

in which § 1346 was applied to private actors).

84. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716, 718, 722–23 (9th Cir. 2006).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
86. For example, if a health worker accessed and disclosed to a journalist private information about a patient

in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and used any form of
electronic communication in doing so, the journalist arguably could have been subject to prosecution for
aiding and abetting a violation of the wire fraud statute. In this instance, under a broad reading of
§ 1346, the worker has deprived his employer of the intangible right of his honest services.

87.

130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929 (2010).

88. Id. at 2931.
89. Id. at 2929.
90. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 459

(1987)); see also Reed Enters. v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[P]rosecutions involving
possible collision with First Amendment rights are not subject to the routine consideration given
prosecutions under ordinary criminal statutes.”).

91.

See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 112, 121 (1948) (construing the term “expenditure” in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), to exclude publication-related expenses because, if the statute “were
construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting
their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to
their interests from the adoption of measures or the election to office of men, espousing such measures,
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appropriate when the legislative history of a generally applicable statutory scheme
evinces no intention to criminalize the activities of the press and others engaged in
the process of collecting and disseminating information to the public.92
Let us suppose, for example, that the federal government sought to prosecute a
journalist for receiving and publishing non-public health information about a member
of Congress under a theory that the journalists aided and abetted a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a), the provision of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) authorizing criminal sanctions for the acquisition and
disclosure of protected health information.
Neither the face of HIPAA nor its legislative history reveals any suggestion that
Congress considered or otherwise sought to impose criminal sanctions on the process
by which the press reports to the public about newsworthy matters. Thus, for
example, the criminal penalties for the unlawful use, acquisition, and disclosure of
health information pursuant to HIPAA apply, on their face, only to the conduct of
“covered entities,” which include health plans and health care providers, but contain
no reference to the press or to others who disseminate health-related information
about newsworthy subjects to the public.93 HIPAA’s legislative history confirms both
that its stated purpose was to promote “the efficiency and effectiveness of the health
care system, by encouraging the development of a health information system through
the establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic transmission of
certain health information,” 94 and that it is devoid of references to any perceived
problem—warranting congressional intervention or otherwise — relating to the
disclosure to or subsequent dissemination of health-related information by the press.95
the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality”); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d
844, 852 (2d Cir. 1974) (“It is difficult to imagine a setting where a narrow interpretation would be
more appropriate than when a criminal statute might otherwise impinge on First Amendment
rights.”).
92.

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879 (1997) (“Particularly in the light of the absence of any
detailed findings by Congress,” it is difficult to conclude that a statute that impacts the First Amendment
is “narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all.”).

93.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-6(a)–(b), 1320-9(b)(3) (2006 & Supp. III 2009); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010)
(providing the definition of “covered entity”).

94. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-191, § 261, 110 Stat.

1936, 2021.

95. In addition, it appears that none of the prosecutions that have been pursued under HIPAA to date

contemplate that the statute is designed to reach the press, either directly or through theories of
secondary liability such as “aiding and abetting” and “conspiracy.” See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Att’y for
So. Dist. of Fla., Palmetto General Hospital Employee and Accomplice Indicted for Stealing Patient
Records As Part of Fraud Scheme (May 26, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/f ls/PressReleases/
090526-01.html (describing the indictment of a hospital employee and her accomplice—who allegedly
stole patient information to use in an identity and credit-card theft scheme—for, among other things, a
conspiracy to violate HIPAA); United States v. Hollern, 366 F. App’x 609 (6th Cir. 2010) (analyzing the
constitutionality of an indictment for disclosing personal health information in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-6 when the defendant chiropractor videotaped patients under false pretenses and sold tapes for
commercial gain); Ian C. Smith Dewaal, Successfully Prosecuting Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act Medical Privacy Violations Against Noncovered Entities, U.S. Att’ys’ Bull., July 2007,
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Construing HIPAA to authorize the prosecution of the press, under a theory of
aiding and abetting, necessarily would implicate the First Amendment, and, in view
of HIPAA’s legislative history, a court could fairly conclude that the statute never
was intended to reach the conduct of the press in gathering information from persons
who themselves may have violated the statute.96
B. Criminal Liability and the Press

The First Amendment’s restrictions on the application of criminal liability
theories to members of the press who seek out, receive, and publish information
about newsworthy matters are not simply theoretical. Rather, they have informed the
relationship between the press and the criminal justice system every time a controversy
has arisen in the lower federal courts over the publication of information leaked to
journalists by someone under a legal obligation not to disclose it. As we discuss
below, many of the most important stories in the history of journalism were based on
information provided by sources in violation of a criminal statute.97 In every such
case, moreover, a literal reading of the relevant statutes would support an argument
that the journalist illegally received information or conspired with a source to obtain
or disclose information for an unauthorized purpose.98 Nevertheless, it appears that
no journalist has ever been prosecuted under such theories. Rather, journalists have
only been prosecuted in the rare circumstance where they directly committed an
unlawful physical act, such as removing a piece of debris from the wreckage of a
sabotaged aircraft,99 “stealing documents,” or engaging in “private wiretapping.”100
at 10, 14–15 (discussing United States v. Williams, No. 1:06-CR00129-UNA (D. Del. Nov. 16, 2006), in
which defendant, a hospital employee, conspired to steal identities of four hundred health care
clearinghouse patients and was convicted of, among other things, conspiracy to obtain protected health
information with the intent to sell it for personal gain; Indictment, United States v. Ramirez, No. M-05708 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2005), 2005 WL 5922818, in which defendant sold protected health information
to undercover FBI agents and pleaded guilty to violating HIPAA; and Acceptance of Plea Guilty,
United States v. Gibson, No. CR04-0374RSM (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2004), 2004 WL 2188280, in
which defendant charged with violating 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(3) and (b)(3) by disclosing patient’s
name, date of birth, and social security number to obtain credit cards in patient’s name); Esther Seitz,
Privacy (or Piracy) or Medical Records: HIPAA and Its Enforcement, 102 J. Nat’l Med. Ass’n 745, 747
(2010), available at http://www.nmanet.org/images/uploads/Publications/MLS745.pdf (discussing a
case in which defendant, a licensed nurse, pleaded guilty to disclosing individually identifiable
information about a patient to her husband, who then threatened to use it against the patient in an
upcoming legal proceeding).
96. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929 –30 (2010) (“We have . . . instructed ‘the federal

courts . . . to avoid constitutional difficulties by [adopting a limiting interpretation] if such a construction
is fairly possible.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331
(1988))).

97.

See infra Part III.C.

98. See infra Part III.C.
99. See United States v. Sanders, 17 F. Supp. 2d 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff ’d, 211 F.3d 711 (2d Cir. 2000).
100. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972) (“Although stealing documents or private wiretapping

could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such
confuct, whatever the impact on the flow of news.”). Indeed, we are aware of only one attempt to bring
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Several cases in both the criminal and civil context have in fact considered what
might happen if a prosecution of the press beyond such circumstances were ever
attempted. All have concluded that the First Amendment would likely pose obvious
and potentially insurmountable barriers to the use of both direct and secondary
liability theories to criminalize the pursuit of information by journalists. In United
States v. Morison, for example, a government employee was convicted under both the
Espionage Act and 18 U.S.C. § 641 of providing classified photographs of Soviet
naval installations to Jane’s Defense Weekly (“Jane’s”), a publication that reported on
security-related matters.101 The government charged that the employee, Samuel
Morison, had been effectively compensated by Jane’s for his actions.102 He was a paid
consultant to Jane’s at the time, there was evidence that Jane’s had affirmatively
solicited the transmission of documents from him, and the government alleged that
he hoped to improve his chances of permanent employment at Jane’s by providing the
photographs.103 Not only was Jane’s never charged, but the prosecution of Morison
itself proved controversial in large part due to concern that, in a future case, the
government might be tempted to pursue journalists involved in other exchanges of
information.104
As a result, in affirming Morison’s conviction, two members of the Fourth
Circuit’s three-judge panel wrote separately to emphasize their doubt that the First
Amendment would countenance such a prosecution. Judge Wilkinson explained that
“Morison as a source would raise newsgathering rights on behalf of press organizations
that are not being, and probably could not be, prosecuted under the espionage statute”
and stated that “it is important to emphasize what is not before us today. This
prosecution was not an attempt to apply the espionage statute to the press for either
the receipt or publication of classified materials.”105 Judge Phillips likewise expressed
his concern that the court’s affirmance of Morison’s conviction not be construed to
“threaten[] the vital newsgathering functions of the press.”106
A number of federal courts have similarly considered First Amendment-based
overbreadth challenges by defendants to the application of § 641 to the oral
transmission of government information. In so doing, several have sua sponte cautioned
that obtaining and disclosing information to the press—which was not at issue in
a prosecution against a journalist that is even remotely based on the theories discussed herein. In 1973,
Les Whitten, “the chief investigative reporter for syndicated columnist Jack Anderson,” was charged as
a principal with receiving stolen government documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006). See
Mark Feldstein, The Jailing of a Journalist: Prosecuting the Press for Receiving Stolen Documents, 10 Comm.
L. & Pol’y 137 (2005) (offering detailed account of Whitten’s prosecution). However, the charges were
subsequently dropped when the grand jury declined to issue an indictment. Id. at 161.
101. 844 F.2d 1057, 1060 – 61 (4th Cir. 1988).
102. Id. at 1076.
103. See id. at 1060 – 61, 1076 –77.
104. See id. at 1084.
105. Id. at 1081, 1085 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 1086 (Phillips, J., concurring).
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any of those cases—would raise substantial constitutional questions. Thus, in United
States v. Jeter, the Sixth Circuit held that, in the “limited circumstances” of that
case—which involved leaking grand jury information to the targets of an
investigation—no serious First Amendment barrier existed to affirming the
conviction.107 Nevertheless, the court noted that “[w]e do not attempt to determine
the constitutionality of Section 641 in a ‘Pentagon Papers’ kind of situation.”108
Courts have raised analogous concerns in the civil context. In Zerilli v. Evening
News Ass’n, for example, the D.C. Circuit considered a Bivens claim arising after
newspaper reporter unlawfully conspired with federal officials to procure confidential
transcripts of illegal wiretaps.109 The Court rejected the theory because, among other
reasons, “finding the newspaper liable in the present case would amount to holding a
newspaper liable in damages for uncovering and publishing information that it deems
newsworthy. The values served by a free and vigilant press militate against such a
result.”110 For this reason, the press has been held potentially liable for conspiring
with federal officials to violate private rights only where some non-speech-related
conduct causing tangible injury to person or property, such as a physical trespass, was
at issue.111
Indeed, the long history of clashes between the government, private parties, and
journalists over subpoenas for their confidential sources reinforces the principle that
a criminal prosecution of reporters whose sources leak information to them would be
beyond the constitutional pale. Such subpoenas have usually arisen in the context of
cases in which confidential sources are alleged to have unlawfully provided
information to a journalist.112 Laws proscribing the disclosure of information, such as
the Privacy Act of 1974113 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e),114 are the
most common sources of such disputes.115 In almost every such case, the facts describe
107. 775 F.2d 670, 682 (6th Cir. 1985).
108. Id.; see also United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that application of § 641 to

intangible investigative information was not overbroad as applied to the defendant, even though “the
statute might conceivably trespass upon the first amendment rights of others”). The reference to “Pentagon
Papers” is to New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), in which the Supreme Court
rebuffed the government’s efforts to secure a prior restraint prohibiting the publication of documents that
“were purloined from the Government’s possession” and that the newspaper defendants solicited and
received “with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired.” Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

109. 628 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
110. Id. at 224.
111. See, e.g., Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999); see also FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC,

Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that attempting to apply broader theories of liability for
misappropriation of intangible information “would certainly raise important First Amendment
problems”).

112. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
114. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) (limiting the disclosure of a matter before a grand jury).
115. See, e.g., Lee v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d

37 (1st Cir. 2004); Hatfill v. Gonzales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2007); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
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a “conspiracy” pursuant to which a journalist provided something that may have been
of substantial value to a source (such as a promise of confidentiality or publicity
which the source may have believed served his or her personal interests) in exchange
for which the source provided information that it was legally prohibited from
disclosing.116 Not only have the reporters in these cases never been criminally charged,
but most courts have recognized that some form of qualified privilege protecting the
source’s identity from compelled disclosure applies in these circumstances,117 and the
legislatures in more than a dozen states have provided for an absolute privilege where
analogous disputes arise under state criminal laws.118
The role of the First Amendment in this context is perhaps best illustrated by
United States v. Rosen,119 also known as the AIPAC prosecution.120 Prior to Rosen, the
government had never used the Espionage Act to charge a civilian who was not
himself alleged to be a spy,121 and had also never applied the provisions of the Act at

438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
116. See supra note 115.
117. See, e.g., Lee, 413 F.3d 53; In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37; Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282

(4th Cir. 2000); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir.
1981); In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1991), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 963 F.2d 567
(3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).

118. Ala. Code § 12-21-142 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2010 Regular and First Spec. Sess.);

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2214, 12-2237 (West, Westlaw through the First Spec. Sess., and
legislation effective Jan. 11, 2011); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-85-510 (LEXIS through the 2010 Fiscal
Sess.); Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (West, Westlaw through c. 733 (end) of the 2010 portion of the 2009–
2010 Regular Sess., the end of the 2009–2010 First through Eighth Extraordinary Sessions, and all
propositions on 2010 ballots); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4320 –26 (LEXIS through 77 Del. Laws,
Ch. 476); D.C. Code §§ 16-4701 to - 4 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 22, 2010); Ind. Code Ann.
§§ 34-46-4-1 to -2 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Public Laws approved and effective through the 2010
Second Regular Sess.); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421.100 (LEXIS through the 2010 First Extraordinary
Sess.); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-112 (LEXIS through all chapters of the 2010 Regular
Sess. with updates for sections effective through Jan. 1, 2011); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 26-1-901 to - 03
(LEXIS through 2010 Regular and Spec. Sess.); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-144 to -47 (West, Westlaw
through the 101st Legislature Second Regular Sess. 2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.275 (LEXIS through
the 26th (2010) Spec. Sess.); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (LEXIS through 2010); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 2A:84A-21 to -21.8 (LEXIS through the 214th Legislature First Annual Sess.); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (West, Westlaw through 2010 File 58 of the 128th General Assembly
(2009–2010), approved by 2/2/11 and filed with the Secretary of State by 2/2/11); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 44.510 – 40 (West, Westlaw through the laws enacted during the 2010 Spec. Sess. of the 75th Oregon
Legis. Assembly); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5942 (West, Westlaw through Act 92 of the 2010 Regular
Sess. of the Pennsylvania General Assembly); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.68.010 (West, Westlaw
through the 2010 2nd Spec. Sess. and Laws 2011, Chapters 1 and 2); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 885.14 (West,
Westlaw through 2009 Wisconsin Act 406 (End)). In addition, Utah’s Supreme Court, under authority
granted by the state’s constitution, adopted Utah R. Evid. 509 in 2008, granting near absolute
protection for confidential sources. Utah R. Evid. 509; see Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4.

119. 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D. Va. 2006).
121. See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 628–29.
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issue in Rosen to the receipt and disclosure of purely oral information.122 As applied
in those circumstances, the district court in Rosen rejected the government’s argument
that no First Amendment issue was raised by the novel indictment.123 Rather, it
resolved the defendants’ constitutional arguments by holding that the statute could
only survive First Amendment scrutiny as applied to the specific facts alleged if
construed narrowly to require the government to prove a heightened intent
requirement—i.e., that the defendants acted with a bad-faith purpose to undermine
national security.124
C. Potential for Chilling Speech About Newsworthy Matters

Taken as a whole, these disparate strands of law appear to reveal a consistent
theme. Courts have both explicitly and implicitly recognized that any attempt to
seek criminal (or civil) sanctions against the press for providing what might be
deemed to be incentives to sources so that they will provide information about
newsworthy matters would face substantial First Amendment hurdles.125
A different constitutional rule — one that would permit the imposition of criminal
liability on the press when it can broadly be said to have “induced” or “conspired”
with a source to secure newsworthy information for publication—would fundamentally
alter public discourse. If, for example, the press could be prosecuted for “aiding and
abetting” violations of the Privacy Act, it would appear that the Washington Post, Bob
Woodward, and Carl Bernstein could all have been charged in the wake of their
persistent solicitation and receipt of information from FBI Deputy Director Mark
Felt about the FBI’s then-ongoing investigation of specific, identified persons
implicated in the Watergate investigation who had not yet been indicted.126 Similarly,
it would appear that the San Francisco Chronicle could have been charged with aiding
and abetting a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) when a criminal
defense lawyer agreed to provide the Chronicle with details of grand jury testimony
given by some of the most prominent athletes in professional sports as part of a
Pulitzer-Prize winning series of articles about the extent to which performanceenhancing drugs had infiltrated both professional and amateur athletics.127 And
122. See id. at 614.
123. Id. at 629–30 (“[T]he conduct at issue—collecting information about United States’ foreign policy and

discussing that information with government officials . . . , journalists, and other participants in the
foreign policy establishment—is at the core of the First Amendment’s guarantees.”).

124. See id. at 625–27; see also United States v. Rosen, 240 F.R.D. 204, 209 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2007).
125. Cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 531 (2001) (“Although this case demonstrates that there may be

an occasional situation in which an anonymous scanner will risk criminal prosecution by passing on
information without any expectation of financial reward or public praise, surely this is the exceptional
case.”).

126. See John D. O’Connor, I’m the Guy They Called Deep Throat, Vanity Fair, July 2005, at 86.
127. See, e.g., Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Giambi Admitted Taking Steroids, S.F. Chron., Dec. 2,

2004, at A1; Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, What Bonds Told BALCO Grand Jury, S.F.
Chron., Dec. 3, 2004, at A1.
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criminal liability could apparently have been imposed on the Wall Street Journal for
its solicitation and receipt of internal Enron documents from confidential sources
within the company that detailed Enron’s illegal accounting practices; those
documents led to a groundbreaking series of articles, but were provided by disgruntled
employees, arguably in breach of their fiduciary obligations to the company.128
By the same token, it would appear that analogous theories of liability for
violations of HIPAA would have provided the basis for criminal prosecution of the
Orange County Register as a result of its Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting on the
unethical practices of the previously acclaimed fertility clinic at the University of
California-Irvine.129 That reporting was based on the contents of putatively
confidential medical records obtained by the newspaper from a source within the
clinic—records which documented how eggs retrieved from one patient were
implanted in another, without the knowledge or consent of the donor.130 Under the
same theories, one could envision prosecution of a newspaper that reported, based on
confidential medical records received from a hospital employee, that the Vice
President had developed a serious heart condition, that several hospital patients who
had recently traveled abroad had contracted a highly contagious disease and brought
it to the United States, or that the serious illness of several hospital patients had been
traced to tainted meat circulating in the national food supply.
IV. CONCLUSION: FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS

The preceding discussion illuminates the First Amendment-based principles that
likely would govern judicial determination of the constitutionality of a prosecution of
128. See, e.g., Rebecca Smith & John R. Emshwiller, Trading Places: Fancy Finances Were Key to Enron’s Success,

and Now to Its Distress, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 2001, at A1. For other examples of award-winning
journalism made possible by the “inducement” of sources to provide newsworthy information to the
press in breach of fiduciary duties owed to their employers or otherwise unlawfully, see Seymour M.
Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib; American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis. How Far Up Does the Responsibility Go?,
New Yorker, May 10, 2004, at 42 (news report of abuse of Iraqi prisoners based on confidential
documents and photographs provided to reporter by unnamed source within U.S. military); Walter
Pincus, Carter Is Weighing Radiation Warhead, Wash. Post, June 7, 1977, at A5 (news report of
government’s plans to produce “neutron bomb” based on classified information received by journalist
from government informant); Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate Is Growing
Within Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, Wash. Post, Nov. 2,
2005, at A1 (news report disclosing CIA practice of sending suspected terrorists to secret prisons in
foreign countries based on classified documents leaked to reporter by government sources); James Risen
& Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (news
reports discussing classified program of domestic wiretapping based on information provided to
reporters by government sources).

129. See Susan Kellerher & Kim Christensen, Baby Born After Doctor Took Eggs Without Consent, Orange

County Reg., May 19, 1995, at A1.

130. See id. The newspaper eventually discovered and reported that at least sixty women were victims of such

theft by the clinic. See Susan Kellerher, Kim Christensen, David Parrish & Michelle Nicolosi, Clinic
Scandal Widens, Orange County Reg., Nov. 4, 1995, at A16. The facts that the newspaper reported
resulted in the criminal prosecution of the physicians involved, “prompted the American Medical
Association to rewrite its fertility-industry guidelines,” and instigated legislative action. See Kim
Christensen, Fertility Bills Seen as Effective Steps, Orange County Reg., Aug. 30, 1996, at A26.
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the press in the wake of its acquisition and publication of information received from
a person who accessed or provided such information in violation of a criminal statute.
These principles suggest that, at a minimum, the solicitation, receipt, and publication
of information by the press can constitutionally be deemed to violate such statutes
only if their scope is cabined, by legislative amendment or judicial decision, in
material ways. Otherwise, the reach of such statutes would appear to be extraordinarily
broad, reaching any effort by a reporter to secure information from a source that, for
example, its employer (including the government) would prefer remain secret.
Accordingly, it appears that, at a minimum, the application of such statutes to the
press, whether directly or through laws imposing secondary liability, can survive
First Amendment scrutiny only if construed to require that (1) the press conduct at
issue be unrelated to communicative acts involving the transmission of information,
or (2) the defendant evince some bad-faith purpose other than and beyond the intent
to obtain information for the purpose of reporting it to the public.
Absent such limitations, it appears there is a substantial argument that any
prosecution of the press for violating such a criminal statute, for aiding and abetting
a violation of such a statute, or for conspiring with a source to violate such a statute—
based on the contention that the press had “induced” or “conspired” with a third
party to engage in unlawful activity—would violate the First Amendment. As the
Supreme Court has recognized on several occasions, a broad range of press conduct
that involves “soliciting, inquiring, requesting and persuading” sources “to engage in
the unauthorized and unlawful disclosure of information”131 is protected by the
Constitution. A statutory scheme that purports to criminalize such activity, without
both specifying and cabining its reach, would be unlikely to survive a constitutional
challenge, whether it is analyzed under the First Amendment-based requirement
that even a statute that has an incidental impact on protected speech must be
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest”;132 under the First
Amendment-based “overbreadth” doctrine;133 or under the Fifth Amendment, which
“prohibits punishment pursuant to a statute so vague that ‘men of common intelligence

131. Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 Cal. Rptr. 58, 64 (Ct. App. 1986).
132. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.

FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 216 (1997) (“‘[T]he essence of narrow tailoring’ is ‘focussing [sic] on the evils the
[Government] seeks to eliminate . . . [without] significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech
that does not create the same evils.’” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989))); Boehner II, 484 F.3d 573, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Sentelle,
J., dissenting) (stating that where federal wiretap statute on its face yielded a result that “no one in the
United States could communicate on [a] topic of public interest,” it could not be constitutionally applied
to the acquisition and dissemination of newsworthy information); Boehner I, 191 F.3d 463, 485 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“Not only is this not narrow tailoring, this is not tailoring of any
sort.”), vacated, 532 U.S. 1050 (2001).

133. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (“Given a case or controversy,

a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it
substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court.”).
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must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’”134 Thus, the
government would face a daunting task in crafting a statute that would survive
constitutional scrutiny.

134. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 617 (E.D. Va. 2006) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520

U.S. 259, 266 (1997)).
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